1.What does Russell mean by ”sense
data” and why does he introduce this notion?
Why do we perceive an actual object
the way we do? This is the way Russell discusses the sense data and argue about
how we immediately identify a certain object. Russell underlines that
reflection is made by a person in two categories: knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge by description. The sense data could be presented as an interaction
with objects surrounding us. These objects are reflected in the mean of our personal
senses and can therefore have different outcomes depending on what person
perceives the particular object. Different senses are used by interpretation of
the object such as smell, color and shape. Russell emphasizes a difference of
perceiving information data and the question if it really exists or if the
reality is not actually the appearance of an object how we perceive it.
2. What is the meaning of the terms
“proposition” and “statement of fact”? How does propositions and statement of
facts differ from other kinds of verbal expressions?
According to Russell a proposition is
defined as a personal belief about a specific item. This belief can in many
cases vary between from whom the proposition is implied from. Different circumstances can in this
case be relevant. For example: “John is very tall”, we don’t know if this is
true or false because the person who makes the proposition might be really
short – which shows that it is a personal assumption about John and has not
necessarily have to be true for one who has not made the statement.
A
proposition might be the base to the statement of fact - where a certain amount
of people recognizes the proposition and considering it to be true. This can be
supported by different facts such as “the average length in this community is
1.58 cm, and John is 2.30 centimeters which makes him very tall”. This makes it possible to reduce the
fact that he could be short. Although, we cannot eliminate the possibility that
John is tall in other communities. In both these cases it exists truths and
falsehoods, even though statement of facts might be including a bit more truth.
They both differ from other kinds of verbal expressions because they are
subjective and dependable on context and surroundings if they are true or
not.
3. In chapter 5 (“knowledge by
Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”) Russell introduces the notion
“define description”. What does this notion mean?
According
to Russell our knowledge for an object could be increased through a definite
description - which he states is in the form "the so-and-so". This
decreases misunderstanding and is more developed than the ambiguous description,
which is in "a so-and-so" form. An ambiguous description could be for
example "a building" while the definite description is more than just
a singular object - such as "a school building designed in the mid
eighties". In a way we could imagine ourselves a funnel where the
ambiguous description is in the beginning and the definite distinguishes the
wide spectrum towards understanding the subject in a greater term.
4. In
chapter 13 (“Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion”) and in chapter 14 (“The
Limits of Philosopical Knowledge”) Russell attacks traditional problems in
theory of knowledge (epistemology). What are the main points in Russell’s
presentation?
In the
chapters Russell discusses knowledge in the sense of the possibility to
interpret how we can know if something is true or false. He states that
our knowledge is perceived in a way that it may be a true belief that is based
on a false proposition. But what is true belief? Russell underlines the two
structures of understanding towards the subject: knowledge about truth and
knowledge about things. The fact that we need to be critical towards
trustworthy knowledge is stated in the chapter where he mentions an example
about a man thinking that the late Prime Minister's name starts with
"B", which is true, he thinks that the name is Balfour, but his real
name is Bannerman. This is a typical example of how a truth and conclusion is
based on false premises.